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Rationality and Theistic Belief

I have argued that PT� fails as a complete account because en
gaging in CP does not have the same strength of overall rationality
as engaging in PP, even though it remains prima facie rational to
engage in both. What remains to be done is to consider sqme of
Plantinga's suggestions about epistemic warrant as those sugges
tions apply to the parity thesis, as well as to defend Plantinga's
suggestion that beliefs about God can be properly basic against a
challenge resting on confirmation. The discussion of confirmation
serves as a springboard to the final goal of this book, which is to
suggest and defend a new parity thesis.
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Planting a on Warrant

In Chapters 6 and 7 I argued that PTp) and hence PTPI founder on
the need for background beliefs in the generation and justification
of theistic beliefs. The problem for Plantinga is generated by the
kinds of examples he gives, examples in which the theistic believer
and nonbeliever share the same experience but the former gener
ates a belief about God whereas the latter does not. My discussion
to this point has worked only with Plantinga's essays published
before 1 9 86. His research emphasis changes beginning with his es
say "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in
God, " in which he for the first time considers at some length the
notion of warrant or positive epistemic status as opposed to epi
stemic justification. Although in that essay he is still directly con
cerned about the evidentialist challenge and the proper basicality of
theistic beliefs, later essays and two books deal less directly with
those concerns but tackle the issue of positive epistemic status or
warrant-that thing or quantity enough of which separates mere
true belief from knowledge. What is his account of warrant, and
can it help his case for epistemic parity between paradigm and
theistic beliefs?1
In this chapter I attempt to answer these questions. I first explain
Plantinga's account of warrant and suggest a new parity thesis on
r.

I use the terms "warrant" and "positive epistemic status" interchangeably.
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the basis of his account. The new thesis is weighed and found
wanting for reasons similar to those we have been considering all
along.
r.

Plantinga' s Account of Warrant

Plantinga shifts to the language of warrant and posttlve epts
temic status from the language ofjustification. He writes:

'
t
.I

.i

.ti

What is this quantity enough of which . . . epistemizes true belief?
. . . Whatever exactly this further element or quantity may be, it is
either epistemic justification or something intimately connected
with it. So perhaps the natural procedure would be just to baptize
this element, what ever it is, "epistemic justification." But this
would be misleading. The term "justification" suggests duty, obli
gation, permission, and rights-the whole deontological stable .
Furthermore, one of the main contending theories or pictures here
. . . explicitly identifies the quantity in question with aptness for epis
temic duty folfillment; to use the term "justification, " then, as a name
for the quantity in question would be to give this theory a confusing
and unwarranted (if merely verbal) initial edge over its rivals. I shall
therefore borrow Chisholm's more neutral term "positive epistemic
status" as my official name for the quantity in question.2

Elsewhere he uses the term "warrant" for this same item. 3
What is positive epistemic status? Plantinga says, following Chis
holm, that it is a term of epistemic appraisal. Furthermore, it
comes in degrees. Finally, it is related to knowledge. Thus, "posi
tive epistemic status . . . initially and to a first approximation, is a
normative property that comes in degrees, enough of which is
what epistemizes true belief. "4
In various places Plantinga examines and finds wanting other ac
counts of warrant. He rejects Chisholmian internalism, non-Chis2. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, " pp. 2-3 .
3. See Plantinga, "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection t o Belief in
God," p. 1 1 9, Warrant and Proper Function, and Warrant: The Current Debate. These
last two works give the fullest account of Plantinga's thinking on warrant. Unfor
tunately, at the time the present book went to press, Plantinga's books were not
yet published. Unless otherwise noted, where I quote in this chapter fro m these
works, the page numbers are those of Plantinga's final manuscripts.
4. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, " p. J.
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holmian internalism, coherentism, and reliabilism. I do not recount
the details of his criticisms, but his basic point in many, if not all,
cases is that the accounts "come to grief when we reflect on the
variety of ways in which our noetic faculties can fail to function
properly. " In each case, the reason for the failure of the accounts
"is cognitive malfonction, failure of the relevant cognitive faculties to
function properly. "5 This observation results in a positive charac
terization of positive epistemic status. Following Plantinga's lead,
let us consider this account one aspect at a time.
One necessary condition of positive epistemic status is that one's
"cognitive equipment, one's belief forming and belief sustaining
apparatus, be free of . . . cognitive malfunction. A belief has posi
tive epistemic status for me only if my cognitive apparatus is func
tioning properly, working the way it ought to work in producing
and sustaining it. "6 Plantinga notes that proper functioning is not
to be identified with normal functioning. One's cognitive equip
ment might be functioning normally (in the statistical sense) when
one forms the wishful belief that one is about to win the Nobel
Peace Prize. Under such conditions, one's equipment is not func
tioning properly; it is not functioning the way it ought to, but it is
functioning normally.
Furthermore, consider a case in which your cognitive equipment
is functioning well in the environment for which it was meant but
you are moved to an environment in which your equipment was
not meant to function-Alpha Centauri, for example. Suppose
there are subtle epistemic differences in the two worlds. Cats are
invisible in Alpha Centauri, but whenever one is present to a hu
man he or she forms the belief that a dog is barking. Suppose there
is a cat present, and hence you hear a dog barking. Even if there is
a dog barking (in a soundproof room) and thus one's belief that
there is a dog barking is true, the belief has little by way of positive
epistemic status. One's equipment may be functioning properly for
its home environment, but it does not match the environment in
5. Quotation from Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Func
tion , " p. 3 2. On these issues, see also Plantinga, "Chisholmian Intemalism, " in
Philosophical Analysis: A Defence by Example, ed. David Austin (Boston: D. Reidel,
1 987), "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Obj ection to Belief in God, " "Justifica
tion and Theism, " Warrant and Proper Function, and Warrant: The Current Debate.
6. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, " p. 32.
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which it is operating. "So we must add another component to pos
itive epistemic status; your faculties must be in good working or
der, and the environment must be appropriate for your particular
repertoire of epistemic powers. "7
The final aspect to warrant is the addition of a "firmness of be
lief' rider. Plantinga says that it is tempting simply to identify a
beliefs having positive epistemic status with its being produced by
properly functioning equipment in the appropriate environment.
This identification would be mistaken, however. Two beliefs could
be thus formed and yet one have much more warrant than the
other. Belief in the corresponding conditional of modus ponens has
more warrant than a vague memory belief even though both are
formed by properly functioning equipment in the correct environ
ment. What is needed here is recognition that when one's epistemic
equipment is working well one's beliefs are held with the appropri
ate level of firmness:
Obviously another element of positive epistemic status is the degree
to which I do or am inclined to accept the belief in question; I can't
be said to know p, for example, unless I believe it very firmly in
deed. If my faculties are working properly, the more strongly I be
lieve . . . p the more positive epistemic status p has for me. When
our cognitive establishment is working properly, the strength of the
impulse towards believing a given proposition . . . will be propor
tional to the degree it has of positive epistemic status-or if the
relationship isn't one of straightforward proportionality, the appro
priate functional relationship will hold between positive epistemic
status and this impulse.8

So, at this stage Plantinga's account of warrant is this: "In the
paradigm cases of warrant, belief B has warrant for S if and only if
that belief is produced in S by his epistemic faculties working
properly in an appropriate environment, and if both B and B*
have warrant for S, B has more warrant than B* for S if S believes
B more firmly than B*. "9 This account, he says, needs further re
finements, some of which he attempts. I do not, for the most part,
consider these in detail, but only list several of his concerns. First,
7· Ibid . , p. 338. Ibid . , p. 34·
9. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 8 .
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he notes that not all my cogmttve faculties need to be working
properly for a belief to have warrant for me. One's memory may
play one tricks, but that is not a reason to reject introspective be
liefs. Second, proper functioning also comes in degrees. A faculty
does not have to be functioning perfectly in order to produce war
ranted beliefs. Third, that one's environment is misleading need
not deprive one's belief of warrant. "What counts . . . are uncor
rected and uncompensated malfunctionings. "10
A more central issue is what Plantinga calls the "design plan. "
Comparing human beings by analogy to an automobile, he sug
gests that, just as there are specifications for an engine's operation,
so there are specifications for the way a human being operates. He
writes that there is
something like a set of specifications for a well-formed, properly
functioning human being-an extraordinarily complicated and
highly articulated set of specifications. . . . Suppose we call these
specifications a "design plan," leaving open the question whether
human beings and other creatures have in fact been designed. Then
of course the design plan will include specifications for our cognitive
faculties (as well as for the rest of our powers and faculties). They
too can work well or badly; they can misfunction or function prop
erly. They too work in a certain way when they are functioning
properly-and work in a certain way to accomplish their purpose.11

Our design plan is such that our faculties are "highly responsive
to circumstances. " Intuition, sight, memory, and so forth do not
all operate the same way. Experience-both sensuous experience
and the sort of experience involved in feeling impelled or disposed
to accept a given belief-is important in the responses of our epi
stemic faculties. And the design plan orders us such that the pur
pose of our epistemic faculties is the production of beliefs that are
true rather than false. There may be aspects of the design plan that
allow for other ends for faculties. It might be part of the design
plan that a person with an illness that typically leads to death be
lieves that she will be the exception to the statistics telling her that
it is highly likely that she will die. This feature of the design plan
ro. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," p. 36.
I I. Ibid. ' pp. 36-37-
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may increase the chances of survival. Nevertheless, she is not war
ranted in such a belief. Or certain kinds of wishful thinking-that
one's girlfriend still loves one, for example, when the evidence is
against it-may reduce one's suffering and hence be a �ood
thing-part of the design plan-and yet one is not thereby war
ranted in that belief. And so Plantinga wants to concentrate on that
segment of the design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs.
He also argues that his picture of warrant can help us deal with
Gettier problems:
We might generalize the idea of a design plan: there is a design plan
not only for our cognitive faculties, but for the entire cognitive situ
ation. Take the metaphor in this notion of design more seriously for
the moment; then the designer of our cognitive powers will have
designed those powers to produce mostly true beliefs in the sorts of
situations their owners ordinarily encounter. The designer will be
aiming at a kind of match between cognitive powers and cognitive
environment; there will be, we might say, a sort of design plan not
just for cognitive faculties but for cognitive-faculties-cum-cognitive
environment. In Gettier situations, however, there are relatively
minor departures from the design plan for the cognitive situation in
question; the cognitive environment [or the cognizer's equipment]
then turns out to be misleading for someone with our cognitive
powers. And the force of saying that in these cases the beliefs just
happen to be true, are true by accident . [is that] the belie£Is]'s being
true [are] not a result of things working in accordance with the de
sign plan. '2
.

.

This account of warrant is, clearly enough, a kind of external
ism. What are its relationships to internalism? Let me point out
only a few highlights. In speaking of Alston's account of justifica
tion-an account that we have seen has both internalist and exter
nalist components-Plantinga says that, once Alston (rightly) re
jects the deontological notion of justification, he has to choose
among many "epistemically valuable but non-deontological states
of affairs" such as usually believing the truth, now believing the
truth, having a belief formed by a reliable belief producing mecha
nism, and so forth. Plantinga suggests that Alston is guided in his
choice by the received tradition in epistemology which "involves a
marriage of the idea that deontological justification is central to
12. Ibid., p. 42.
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warrant . . . with the notion that .
a fundamental intellectual
duty is that of believing only on the basis of evidence. " Hence we
find Alston's emphasis on grounds and on the accessibility of those
grounds. But Plantinga notes that the received tradition is incoher
ent: although it claims that deontological justification is sufficient
for warrant, clearly it is not. One can have done all one's duties, be
within one's epistemic rights, and so forth, and yet have little if
any warrant for one's beliefs. Also, there is supposed to be a con
nection between evidence and warrant. But the deontologically
justified belief need not rest on evidence. Plantinga's point is that,
insofar as Alston's understanding of j ustification is constrained by
the received tradition (even though Alston explicitly rejects a
straightforwardly deontological account of justification), it foun
ders on the fact that all we need for counterexamples to it are
"cases where some phenomenon is in fact a reliable indicator of the
truth of a proposition, but my believing the proposition in ques
tion on the basis of that phenomenon arises from cognitive mal
function. " So even though Alston moves away from deontological
notions of justification, he does not completely escape their influ
ence, at least according to Plantinga. 13
So, says Plantinga, epistemic duty fulfillment is not nearly suffi
cient for warrant. Since the internalist tradition is, by and large,
deontologically understood, an internalist aspect to justification is
not sufficient either. But is it necessary? In particular, is epistemic
duty fulfillment necessary? Plantinga's answer is an initial no. But
his answer here is not firm. 14 First he notes that one can conclude
that in general the doing of one's intellectual duty is neither neces
sary nor sufficient for warrant. But then he goes on to wonder
whether it sometimes is important. He specifically wonders how to
state a question about this issue, for if duty fulfillment is not neces
sary, how can it be important, ever? He concludes by stating:
The deontological internalist ordinarily exaggerates our degree of
control over our own beliefs; and she is certainly mistaken in think
ing that epistemically dutiful behavior is sufficient for warrant. It
13. Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, pp. 246, 248, 252.
14. In, perhaps, more ways than one. What I say and quote in this paragraph is
not derived from the version of the manuscript Plantinga sent to the publisher.

The discussion does not, to my knowledge, appear in those final versions. I there
fore do not wish to put too much weight on this point.
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also seems that dutifulness isn't necessary for high degrees of war
rant (although here there is more room for doubt). Still, there are
indeed circumstances when a failure to be dutiful is all that stands
between me and high warrant. And now the main point: when
things are going properly, when I am behaving in accord with the
design plan for human beings, I will not be violating my epistemic
duty. Perhaps it is my duty not to take drugs that will prevent me
from forming true beliefs or cause me to form wildly false ones; our
design plan, you might say, presupposes that I �on't do that; it
makes no provision for my doing that, and if I do that my faculties
will not produce the results they are supposed to. No doubt it is
part of my epistemic duty not to try to alter my noetic inclinations
and tendencies just for the fun of it, to try to become extremely
skeptical, for example, so that I come to believe next to nothing
or, on the other hand, to become unduly gullible . . .. Our design
plan includes our doing our epistemic duty, at least for the most
part."

So there is some kind of "epistemic duty fulfillment intemalism" in
volved in warrant, but the relationship is not a clear one-except that
this intemalist aspect is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant.
In another place Plantinga allows for an intemalist aspect to war
rant-conferring circumstances that is not obviously related to de
ontological considerations. Plantinga notes Alston's rejection of the
demand that one must know or justifiably believe the epistemic
principles on which one's beliefs rest. He grants that one may be
lieve that 2 + 1 = 3 on the basis of its just seeming utterly obvious
to one. Neither justification nor warrant requires that one have any
views as to whether its seeming that way to one is a reliable indica
tion of its actually being that way. But this is not true in all cases,
says Plantinga. One may believe that a bear has passed by on the
basis of the way the brush looks; and to have warrant for this be
lief, one must know or warrantedly believe that the brush's having
that particular crushed sort of look is indeed a reliable indicator
that a bear has been by. In summary Plantinga writes:
So there isn't anything at all like a simple, single answer to the ques
tion whether warrant for grounded beliefs requires that the subject
know that the ground is [a reliable] indicator of the belief; some
times this is required and sometimes it is not. And the reason is not
15. Quoted from an early draft of Plantinga's work on warrant, the chapter on
externalism, p. 22.
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far to seek. In some cases it is perfectly in accord with proper cogni
tive function to believe A on the basis of B even if you have never
had any views at all as to whether B is an indictor of A; in a wide
variety of other cases a properly functioning human being will be
lieve A on the basis of B only if she has first learned that B reliably
indicates A; in certain cases where you are aware of partial malfunc
tion, to have warrant you will have to believe of a ground that it is a
reliable indicator, even though in the absence of such malfunction
you would not have had to have any views at all on the subject. Of
course there will be many other complications. And the point is that
it is the complex, highly articulated nature of the human design plan
that makes impossible simple generalizations of these sorts about
rationality and warrant. 16
One presumes that such an occasional requirement does not lead to
an infinite regress of the type that motivates Alston to deny the
requirement that one be justified in believing the justificatory prin
ciples that ground one's beliefs.
The central point in all this is just that the basic idea of Plan
tinga's account of warrant is extemalist even though intemalist fea
tures sometimes come into play. These cannot be specified ahead
of time, for they are dependent on details of the epistemic situa
tions. In sum, then, Plantinga says, there is a presupposition in
thinking about warrant in the way he suggests. This presupposi
tion is that
when our faculties function in accord with the design plan (in an
appropriate environment) the beliefs they produce are for the most
part true . . . . Further, we take it for granted that these faculties are
reliable; they not only do produce true beliefs, but would produce true
beliefs even if things were moderately different.. . . our presupposi
tion is that in general (for a person S with properly functioning
faculties in an appropriate environment, and given the above quali
fications [not all of which have been discussed in this chapter]) the
more firmly S believes p, the more likely it is that p is true. 17
2.

Warrant, Knowledge, and the Parity Thesis

Recognizing that Plantinga's concerns just explained are not
those of his earlier essays in which he directly argues for an epi16. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 56.
17. Ibid., p. 19.
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stemic parity between paradigm and theistic beliefs, it is neverthe
less worth while to ask how his account of warrant might apply to
the issue of parity. Can it help PTp1? The first thing to note is the
obvious role Plantinga's theism has played in the development of
his account of warrant. This role is explicitly discussed in "Justi
fication and Theism. " To keep the point short, since Plantinga is a
theist, it is natural for him to think of humans, made in the image
of God, as cognitive creatures capable of knowing. Hence God is
the designer, and the notion of a design plan is a natural outflow
ing of this view of the world. But Plantinga does not suggest that
one has to be a theist in order to accept his account, or that his
account obviously entails theism. It may, but he does not press the
point.
Nevertheless, given that God is the maker of the design plan,
and that he is loving, kind, and interested in us knowing him, it is
natural to think that God would have included in the human de
sign plan a way we could come to know God. Plantinga's occa
sional reference to Calvin's sensus Divinitas illustrates this. What is
the relationship between these suggestions and the claim that be
liefs about God can be properly basic? Plantinga himself asks this
question and urges other theistic philosophers to consider it too. 18
Clearly, a beliefs being properly basic is not the same thing as its
being warranted; a beliefs being properly basic is not sufficient for
warrant. Since proper basicality, as I have been using the term, is a
kind ofjustification, and warrant and justification are not the same
thing, then warrant and proper basicality are not the same thing. 19
But is a beliefs being warranted (in a noninferential manner)
sufficient for its being properly basic? This is not clearly the case;
even though one is generally doing one's epistemic duty when
one's epistemic equipment is functioning properly, Plantinga indi
cates that the connection is not a necessary one. So being properly
basic, that is, being noninferentially normatively justified (being
within one's rights in holding a belief without discursive evidence)
is not straightforwardly analyzable in terms of proper function.
Nevertheless, Plantinga's earlier work certainly relies on the sup
position that there is one piece of our belief-forming equipment
r 8. Plantinga, "Justification and Theism," p. 425.
19. In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga does make use of the notion of
basicality in ways not necessarily connected to justification. See Chapters 3 and 5,
for example.
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that generates theistic beliefs. So perhaps to the extent that he
would say that the generation of theistic beliefs is due to the proper
functioning of our equipment it is fair to suggest that PTPI receives
some support from his latest analysis. Just as our equipment func
tions properly to generate and warrant paradigm beliefs, so it oper
ates to generate and warrant theistic beliefs. To the extent that a
beliefs having warrant for us makes that beliefjustified for us, it is
true to say that Plantinga's analysis of warrant supports PTPI·
More direct yet is this suggestion. Although epistemic justifica
tion (and its internalism, deontologism, proper basicality, etc.) is
an interesting and important notion, it does not provide us with an
analysis of the feature that turns mere true belief into knowledge.
Since we are interested in the strongest account of epistemic parity,
what more could we ask than to say that propositions about physi
cal objects, other minds, and the past, on the one hand, and God
and his actions, on the other, can all be known? So, just as Mary
can know that there is a tree in front of her, she can know that
God exists, or perhaps that he wants her to concentrate on philo
sophical theology rather than the ontology of art. Such a parity
thesis would certainly be interesting. And I believe Plantinga's
work might allow him to make such a claim. But let us set knowl
edge aside for the moment and simply ask about a parity thesis
making reference to warrant.
Plantinga might suggest that both paradigm beliefs and theistic
beliefs have warrant, but since there are levels of warrant, to make
it a parity thesis he might propose the following:
Plantinga's Parity Thesis* (PTti): For person S, whose
epistemic equipment is functioning properly in the appro
priate environment, paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs
have the same level of epistemic warrant.
A more narrowly construed parity thesis is
Plantinga's Parity Thesis*' (PT ;;): For a person S, whose
epistemic equipment is functioning properly in the appro
priate environment, physical object beliefs and theistic be
liefs have the same level of epistemic warrant.
If that level of warrant is strong enough for knowledge, and if one
believes a true theistic proposition, then one can know the theistic

I
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proposition, just as one can know the paradigm propositions, or,
more particularly, hysical object propositions.
Are PTt\ or PT PJ
I true? I suggest not, for something like the rea
sons we have considered all along. Let us suppose that, for the
kinds of reasons discussed throughout this essay, even where one's
equipment is functioning properly, the part that generates and
warrants theistic belief must rely on background beliefs. Where it
is justification, as opposed to warrant, that is at stake, the back
ground beliefs themselves need justification. At least so I have ar
gued. With warrant, however, this is not true. One's epistemic
equipment may need background beliefs for the generation of cer
tain kinds of beliefs, but warrant may derive simply from the
proper function of the equipment in the appropriate environment
(and so forth) . The background beliefs appealed to may not them
selves need to be warranted. Nevertheless, the reliance of our
equipment on background beliefs worries us epistemically, even if
no warrant is explicitly required for them. The basic reason for this
is complexity. There is more room for slip-ups or mistakes. Epi
stemic practices involving background beliefs may function as well
as those that do not, but the simple fact of their greater complexity
warns us away from trusting them as much, even if they are func
tioning properly in their environment. Put another way, even if
functioning properly, two practices may function differently and
one may not function as well as the other. Memory, for example,
may not be as reliable in producing true beliefs as perception. So,
noninferential mediated practices may not be as reliable as concep
tual-reading practices. This is true whether Plantinga understands
the role of experience to be of the direct Alstonian type or the
exaggerated Alstonian type considered in earlier chapters. In the
case of PT �, physical object beliefs and theistic beliefs are always
separate, epistemically, since the practice delivering one is a nonin
ferential mediated practice and the practice delivering the other is a
conceptual-reading practice. The appeal to background beliefs in
identifying an experience as one of an epistemically unique individ
ual simply puts epistemic practices that make such an appeal on a
different epistemic level. This does not entail that one does not
have warrant for theistic beliefs, or that one can not know them. It
only says that there is some reason to think that the level of war
rant is not the same. Furthermore, this does not mean that belief-
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forming practices that are noninferential mediated practices are not
practices capable of generating warranted beliefs. It may be part of
the design plan that some practices are noninferential mediated
practices, just as some practices, or at least some application of
practices, need access to beliefs about the reliability of the practice,
as Plantinga suggests.
What about memory beliefs and beliefs about other persons? The
issue is less clear, at least to me, in the case of memory. It seems
that memory is a conceptual-reading practice, or at least not a
practice in which one uses background beliefs. Suppose one's
memories are attended by the sensuous experience to which Plan
tinga refers in several places. Surely one simply forms the memory
belief in the conceptual-reading manner noted above. At least it
seems obvious that one generally does not bring in background
beliefs. If, on the other hand, one's memories are not attended by
the sensuous experience, as some apparently are not, then it seems
quite clear that no background beliefs are needed for the formation
of memory beliefs; they are simply present to one's consciousness.
The practice or subpractice of generating beliefs about other per
sons needs further analysis, which I defer until the next chapter.
Let me j ust say that, as with PP versus unique physical object prac
tice, and religious practice versus CP, there seems to be a distinc
tion between the practice of forming beliefs that categorize what is
experienced into kinds of things (persons) and the practice of form
ing beliefs about epistemically unique persons. Insofar as Plan
tinga's concern is the former, then PTt\ (as well as PTPh for that
matter) is not true with respect to other-mind paradigm be
liefs.
Back to the main point. There is some reason to think PTt\ is
not true, most obviously in the case of the parallel between the
formation and warranting of theistic beliefs and physical object be
liefs. But even though I suggest that there are different levels of
warrant for theistic beliefs as opposed to physical object beliefs,
this does not show that one could not know theistic propositions.
There is, as Plantinga notes, a minimal level of warrant needed for
knowledge. But nothing says that a proposition could not have
more warrant for me than is needed for knowledge (and thus one
could perhaps know one thing more strongly than another) . So
even though, as it seems to me, PTt\ is not true, a parity thesis
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according to which one can know both paradigm beliefs and theis
tic beliefs might be made out.
Plantinga's account of warrant does not help the parity thesis
vis-a-vis justification. In the next chapter I consider a challenge to
Plantinga's claim that belief in God can be properly basic. It is
found unsuccessful, but the discussion leads to some further obser
vations and the development of a new parity thesis that does not
fall prey, I believe, to the background belief challenge.

(
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Confirmation and Theism

My focus has been to explain and analyze various versions of the
parity thesis. One goal in this chapter is to explore a challenge to
Plantinga's claim that theistic beliefs can be properly basic. In
Chapter 2 I explained Alston's response to a challenge relying on
the supposed lack of confirmation of theistic beliefs. In Chapter 4 I
used a similar challenge to refute PT AS· The challenge to Plan
tioga's position also rests on the notion of confirmation. The lesser
part of my purpose here is to show that Alston's reply to the con
firmation challenge is appropriately applied to the challenge to
Plantinga's position. The more important goal is to use the discus
sion of confirmation as a springboard to further observations. This
discussion enables me to develop, in the next chapter, a new parity
thesis that does not fall prey to the challenges brought against PTA
and PTPI· Thus, in Sections I and 2 I present what I call the "pre
dictive confirmation challenge" and show that it fails. Section 3
fulfills the other goal, that of making certain observations that feed
into my suggestion that a holistic approach is needed for the justi
fication of theistic belief.
I . The Predictive Confirmation Challenge
The challenge to Plantinga's parity thesis is brought by Richard
Grigg, who writes:

